



Delhi Policy Group

Advancing India's Rise as a Leading Power

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INDO-PACIFIC MONITOR

This publication is a monthly analytical survey of developments and policy trends that impact India's interests and define its challenges across the extended Indo-Pacific maritime space, which has become the primary theatre of global geopolitical contestation. It is authored by Cmde. Lalit Kapur (Retd.), DPG Senior Fellow for Maritime Strategy, assisted by Ms. Divya Rai, based on open source reports and publications. Your comments and feedback may be addressed to the author at lalit@dpg.org.in. To subscribe, please [click here](#).

Cover Images:

Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi meets India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the G20 Summit in Johannesburg, November 23, 2025. Source: Prime Minister's Office of Japan

Ship's crew man the rails during the commissioning ceremony of aircraft carrier Fujian at Sanya on November 05, 2025. Source: Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China

JS Hyuga, INS Sahyadri, USS Fitzgerald and HMAS Ballarat participate in Exercise Malabar 2025 off Guam, November 2025. Source: US 7th Fleet

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INDO-PACIFIC MONITOR

November 2025

Abstract

Relations between Japan and China frayed as the latter sought to undermine Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and pressurise her into retracting her remark that China's use of military force in a Taiwan contingency could constitute a survival threatening situation for Japan. US President Donald Trump reportedly advised Takaichi to temper her comments on the Taiwan issue to avoid endangering his deal making with President Xi Jinping.

Indonesia's President Prabowo Subianto made a state visit to Australia, announcing conclusion of negotiations for a new bilateral treaty committing the two countries to consult with each other at leader and ministerial levels regularly on matters of security, as well as if either country feels threatened. The treaty is expected to be signed in January 2026.

China commissioned its third and largest aircraft carrier, Fujian, into service on November 05. The carrier is equipped with the EMALS aircraft launch system, enabling it to operate heavier aircraft. The first of China's new generation of Amphibious Assault Ships, Sichuan, sailed for a sea trial from November 14-16. The two ships represent the quantum leap taking place in China's naval technology.

Saudi crown prince Mohammad Bin Salman visited the US, renewing Saudi Arabia's strategic partnership with the US that had suffered under the Biden Administration. The visit resulted in the designation of Saudi Arabia as a major non-NATO ally, announcement of a substantial US arms sales package, and a Saudi commitment to invest nearly \$ 1 trillion in the US.

The Thailand-Cambodia ceasefire deal announced by President Trump last month was suspended on November 10 after four Thai soldiers were injured by blasts attributed to Cambodian landmines.

The US formally announced on November 13 approval for South Korea to build nuclear attack submarines at the Hanwha Shipyard in Philadelphia.

The Prime Ministers of Australia, Canada and India announced on November 22 that their countries had entered into a trilateral technology and innovation partnership.



The 3rd Indonesia-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministers 2+2 Meeting took place in Tokyo on November 17, over four years after the second meeting. The ministers agreed to step up cooperation. Japan has proposed building Mogami-class frigates for Indonesia.

The India-Indonesia Defence Ministers' Dialogue took place in New Delhi on November 27. Both sides agreed to enhance defence cooperation, including in defence industry and technology, military-to-military engagements, maritime security, submarine capability and in multilateral forums.

The Prime Ministers of Japan and Fiji held a bilateral summit in Tokyo on November 13 and decided to establish a comprehensive partnership based on unity and trust.

Japan's Ministry of Defence requested a budget of around 8.8 trillion Yen (about \$ 60.2 billion) for FY 2026, reflecting a continued thrust to enhance military spending to 2% of the GDP amid growing regional security challenges.

Australia achieved another milestone in the AUKUS programme when it established the Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator on November 01.

Exercise Malabar 2025 took place off Guam from November 11-18. India was represented by INS Sahyadri. The ship also participated in Exercise AUSINDEX 2025 thereafter.

IRGC forces seized the Cyprus registered tanker MT Talara carrying petrochemicals from Sharjah to Singapore in the Straits of Hormuz on November 14. The tanker was allowed to continue her voyage on November 19.

The Indian Navy commissioned two ships during the month, survey vessel INS Ikshak and the first ASW Shallow Water Craft INS Mahe.

The Impact of Takaichi's Taiwan Remarks

Responding on November 7 to a question in the Diet on what Chinese actions in and around Taiwan would constitute a survival threatening situation for Japan, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said that a Taiwan emergency involving the use of military vessels and military force from the Chinese mainland could constitute such a situation. Her off-the-cuff answer prompted a furious Chinese response that continued throughout the month and sent China-Japan relations into a tailspin.

Under its 2015 national security legislation, Japan can use force for self-defence when an armed attack against Japan or a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness¹. Other conditions to be fulfilled are that there should be no other appropriate means available to repel the attack, and use of force should be limited to the minimum extent necessary. Previous administrations have deliberately been ambiguous on the Taiwan question. Takaichi was not as guarded in replying to a hypothetical, correctly observing that any attempt by China to blockade or seize Taiwan could directly endanger Japan's own security and regional stability.

China's Consul General in Osaka posted "We have no choice but to cut off that dirty neck that has lunged at us without a moment's hesitation"². China's spokesperson condemned her words as constituting gross interference in China's internal affairs and violating the one-China principle, the principles set forth in the four political documents between China and Japan, and basic norms in international relations³. China's Foreign Minister said that the remarks crossed a red line that should not have been touched, and that all countries bear the responsibility to prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism⁴. China also sought retraction of Takaichi's words and warned of severe consequences if Japan were to interfere militarily⁵. Thus, commencing just

¹ Japan's legislation for Peace and Security, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000084.html, accessed November 23, 2025.

² Japan condemns China envoy's 'extremely inappropriate' remarks in Taiwan row, November 10, 2025, <https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/international-relations/taiwan-tensions/japan-condemns-china-envoy-s-extremely-inappropriate-remarks-in-taiwan-row>

³ Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian's Regular Press Conference on November 10, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202511/t20251110_11750313.html

⁴ Japan 'crossed a red line' with Taiwan military intervention remarks, Chinese foreign minister says, November 24, 2025, <https://apnews.com/article/china-japan-wang-yi-sanae-takaichi-taiwan-5e219ac2ffb3052bdd8bf4b4adc7c187>

⁵ China urges Japan to retract its wrong words, deeds, November 17, 2025, <https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/623801#China-urges-japan-to-retract-its-wrong-words,-deeds-2025-11-17>



over a week after Xi Jinping shook hands with Takaichi in Gyeongju, relations between their countries had come under severe pressure⁶.

China's reaction was not limited to words. It sent a Coast Guard patrol to Japan's Senkaku Islands, warned its citizens that Japan was too dangerous to visit resulting in a spate of tourist cancellations, and reimposed the ban on sea food imports from Japan. There is concern that further Chinese economic coercion may be in the offing.

Takaichi's words provided Beijing opportunity to test her mettle through sustained diplomatic and economic pressure. Chinese officials condemned her remarks as provocative, unwise and reminiscent of Japan's pre-war militarism, warning that such statements could destabilise the region and push Taiwan toward greater peril. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has described the remarks as a gross interference in China's internal affairs and a serious violation of the 'One-China Principle', and complained to the UN Secretary General that Takaichi's statement violates international law and the basic norms governing international relations, undermines the post-war order, and constitutes a blatant provocation to the Chinese people⁷. Pointing out that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and how to resolve the Taiwan question is China's internal affair, China's permanent representative to the UN said any attempt by Japan to intervene militarily would amount to aggression, resulting in China firmly exercising its right to self-defence under the UN Charter.

Takaichi has subsequently said, "As a point for reflection, I will refrain from explicitly mentioning specific cases here". However, she refused to retract her remarks, calling them consistent with the government's traditional position. She has noted that they were 'hypothetical' and she would refrain from making similar comments in the future. Her stance reflects a confluence of domestic political and strategic motivations. A Kyodo News poll found that 48.8% of the Japanese public agreed that a Taiwan contingency could be a survival threatening situation for Japan, although 44.2% disagreed. Nationalist sentiment and concern over China's expanding military footprint have been on the rise in Japan. She also supports ongoing efforts to increase defence spending to 2% of the GDP, enhance regulatory frameworks and broaden the scope of Japan's own military capabilities and intelligence laws. These efforts aim to strengthen the US-Japan alliance while projecting an image of an assertive and autonomous nation. In parallel, debates are also ongoing about reviewing Japan's long-standing non-nuclear principles, reflecting broader national security reappraisal as Japan faces a rapidly changing strategic environment.

⁶ President Xi Jinping Meets with Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae, October 31, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202511/t20251101_11745380.html

⁷ Ambassador Fu Cong sends letter to UN secretary-general, condemning Takaichi's remarks on Taiwan, November 22, 2025, <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2025-11-22/China-sends-letter-to-UN-chief-over-Takaichi-s-remarks-on-Taiwan-1Iv6jUscyre/p.html>

Taiwan's President has welcomed Japan's willingness to hedge against Chinese aggression, but others worry that increasing tensions and hardening positions risk sparking a spiral of escalation. The US has greeted the Takaichi government's clarity as a sign of Japan's growing commitment to regional security. The US ambassador has provided assurances of support, but how far the US will go as escalation continues will provide a key test of its commitment to Japan. US President Donald Trump has advised Takaichi to temper her comments around the Taiwan issue as he doesn't want friction to endanger the gains of his summit with Xi Jinping last month. In Japan, critics worry that abandoning ambiguity boxes Japan in, making diplomatic de-escalation more difficult. However, public opinion is behind Takaichi.

Beijing's motivation for escalating what could have been put behind by a routine protest are difficult to discern. China first instinct is usually trying to intimidate foreign governments who don't hew to its diktat as well as domestic opponents. Moreover, China may be hoping to shock Japanese society and activate Takaichi's domestic opponents and undermine her before she can fully consolidate her position as Prime Minister. She is, after all, a protégé of the hawkish Shinzo Abe and no longer has to go along with the China friendly Komeito Party, whose primary goal is improving China-Japan relations, to stay in power.

Sanae Takaichi's Taiwan policy marks the most assertive stance by a Japanese government in recent memory, signalling a break from previous administrations' traditions of strategic ambiguity regarding the Taiwan Strait. The greater strategic clarity will no doubt flow into Japan's next National Security Strategy, due for release in late 2026 or early 2027. It is reshaping both Japan's regional security posture and broader international relations, especially with China and the United States and is a watershed moment in Japanese security policy. By discarding long-established ambiguity, the administration aims to both deter Chinese aggression and reassure allies of Japan's regional commitments. Nonetheless, this clarity comes with new risks, narrowing diplomatic flexibility and potentially increasing the danger of miscalculation. The next year will be crucial as Japan undertakes a broader strategic review, and how Takaichi manages her Taiwan policy will shape the future of security in East Asia.

The Australia Indonesia Security Cooperation Treaty

In May 2025, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visited Jakarta for the annual Australia Indonesia Leaders' summit⁸. He and President Prabowo Subianto witnessed their Foreign Ministers signing the renewed Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Plan of Action for 2025-2029. Less than six months later, Subianto visited

⁸ 2025 Annual Leaders' Meeting Joint Communique, May 15, 2025, <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2025-annual-leaders-meeting-joint-communique>

Australia for his first state visit and met Albanese in Sydney, on November 12. The leaders announced conclusion of negotiations for a new bilateral treaty on the common security of their countries⁹, signalling both deeper cooperation and new strategic commitments between their countries.

Indonesia, the world's third largest democracy and with the world's largest Muslim population, is an immediate neighbour sharing the world's longest maritime boundary with Australia. It is thus one of Australia's most important bilateral relationships. Cooperation between the two countries is underpinned by the Lombok Treaty of 2006¹⁰, which provides a framework for security cooperation including provisions on defence, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, intelligence, maritime security, aviation safety and security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, emergency cooperation and cooperation in international organisations on security-related issues. In 2014, the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening bilateral relations by signing a Joint Understanding on the implementation of the Lombok Treaty. In 2018, they elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, with cooperation centred around five broad pillars: economic and development partnership, connecting people, securing shared interests, maritime cooperation, and contributing to Indo-Pacific security and prosperity. The relationship is underpinned by regular high-level meetings, including an Annual Leaders' Meeting, the 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministers' Meeting, and others. Prior agreements, such as the upgraded Defence Cooperation Agreement of 2024, acted as stepping stones for the newly announced bilateral treaty on common security.

The treaty commits both nations to consult each other at leader and ministerial levels on a regular basis on matters of security to identify and undertake mutually beneficial activities, and, if either country perceives any threat to its security, to consult and consider what measures may be taken either individually or jointly to deal with those threats¹¹. While the text is still to be released, the framework includes elements found in Australia's agreements with the United States (ANZUS), Papua New Guinea (the Pukpuk Treaty), and regional arrangements like the Five Power Defence Arrangements. It indicates Australia's intention to weave Indonesia tighter into its regional network of security partners while respecting Indonesia's longstanding tradition of non-alignment. At the summit, Albanese announced his intention to

⁹ Joint Media Statement – Sydney, November 12, 2025, <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-media-statement-sydney>

¹⁰ Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/agreement-between-the-republic-of-indonesia-and-australia-on-the-framework-for-security-cooperation>

¹¹ Joint Media Statement – Sydney, November 12, 2025, <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-media-statement-sydney>



travel to Indonesia in January 2026 to formally sign the new treaty after it goes through the domestic process of ratification in both countries.

The summit's choreography – marked by ceremonial welcomes and closed-door tête-à-tête meetings – highlights the increasingly personal rapport between Albanese and Subianto. Such gestures aren't trivial; they create space for candid conversations about thorny issues while solidifying the interpersonal trust necessary to navigate future crises. The warm and productive atmosphere, underscored by friendly exchanges and mutual respect, has set a tone of genuine partnership, further reinforced by gestures such as Subianto's signing of the state guest book and joint inspections of the Australian naval base at Sydney.

The treaty comes at a time of heightened uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific. China's assertiveness in the South China Sea remains a significant factor for both Australia and Indonesia. However, Indonesia has remained steadfast in its non-aligned policy, balancing relationships with divergent powers including the United States, China, Russia, and others. The new security agreement doesn't fundamentally alter this stance but provides a structured mechanism for coordinated responses to regional threats—whether maritime, cyber, or humanitarian—while enhancing trust and transparency between Canberra and Jakarta.

Beyond security, the summit also touched on broader strategic and economic aspects. The leaders discussed expanding cooperation in economic development, strategic industries, and maritime affairs. The CSP framework underscores joint efforts, from capacity-building in strategic sectors to collaborative management of regional challenges such as climate change and humanitarian crises. Australia's commitment to supporting Indonesia's malaria eradication goal by 2030 exemplifies the practical, people-to-people dimension of the partnership.

Analysts observe that Indonesia's willingness to enter such a substantive treaty with Australia tests the boundaries of its traditional non-alignment, though the agreement is structured to provide flexibility and maintain Indonesia's "friends to all" philosophy. The summit and its outcomes demonstrate Indonesia's evolving pragmatism, as Subianto seeks to cultivate diverse relationships while being careful not to alienate any strategic partners or neighbours.

The regional response has been one of careful scrutiny, especially among ASEAN members and major powers watching for any shifts in Indonesia's strategic priorities. There is recognition that deeper Australia-Indonesia cooperation adds another layer of complexity to Indo-Pacific dynamics, especially as both countries navigate relations with China, the United States, and other actors.

Despite evident progress in bilateral relations, challenges remain. Differing threat perceptions, political change in either country, and external pressures could strain the

partnership. However, the robust framework now in place offers greater resilience against such disruptions. The partnership's evolution to a comprehensive strategic level embodies both countries' recognition of their interdependence and shared responsibility for regional peace and stability.

The Commissioning of Fujian

41 years after India commissioned Vikrant in March 1961, China followed into naval aviation by commissioning Liaoning (ex-Soviet origin Varyag) in September 2012. On November 05, 2025, the PLA (Navy) dramatically expanded its carrier capability by commissioning its third aircraft carrier, Fujian, into service¹². China's President Xi Jinping attended the ceremony¹³. The ship, the largest warship in the PLA (Navy) and the first aircraft carrier independently designed and built by China, is named for the Fujian province, lying across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan. The ship's keel was laid at the Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai in March 2015, she was launched in June 2022 and commenced sea trials in May 2024.

Fujian is a super carrier, the largest and most advanced ship ever built outside the United States. She is substantially larger than her predecessors. She displaces from 80,000 to 85,000 tons at full load, 15-20,000 tons more than Shandong and over 20,000 tons more than Liaoning. Her length is 316 metres, and she has a beam of 76 metres. Like her predecessors, she is propelled by steam turbines. Where she differs is that she is equipped with three Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch Systems (EMALS), enabling catapult assisted take-off for aircraft, unlike her predecessors which use a ski-jump, making her only the second ship in the world equipped with EMALS, after USS Gerald Ford. The catapult enables Fujian to launch heavier and more capable aircraft. Her larger size enables her to carry an air wing comprising about 60 aircraft, including the fifth generation Shenyang J-35 stealth fighter, the Shenyang J-15T/DT fighter/EW aircraft, Xi'an KJ-600 AEW&C aircraft and Harbin Z-20 helicopters, as against the about 40 fighters and helicopters carried by her predecessors.

China's aircraft carrier ambitions became evident when she acquired the decommissioned Australian carrier HMAS Melbourne in February 1985. The ship was sold to a Chinese company to be scrapped. Prior to her departure from Australia, all electronic equipment and weapons were removed and the rudders welded into a fixed position to avoid the ship's reactivation. Chinese experts were, however, surprised at the amount of equipment that was left in place, including the catapult, arresting gear

¹² China's Fujian aircraft carrier to make regular appearances on high seas: spokesperson, November 08, 2025, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2025xb/H_251454/L_251456/16420651.html

¹³ Xi attends commissioning of China's Fujian aircraft carrier, November 07, 2025, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2025xb/H_251454/L_251456/16420348.html



and optical landing system. By April 1987, Chinese experts had conducted landing and take-off trials using a J-8 interceptor using a land-based flight deck.

China acquired the former Soviet Kiev-class aircraft carriers Minsk and Kiev in 1995 and 2000 respectively. However, both ships were converted into tourist attractions. In 1998, a Chinese company acquired the ex-Soviet Kuznetsov-class carrier Varyag, which was about 70% complete. The ship was towed to Dalian Shipyard and reached in March 2002. She was completed by China in August 2011 and commissioned as Liaoning in September 2012. Construction of the second aircraft carrier, Shandong, began at Dalian Shipyard in November 2013. This ship, a scaled-up version of Liaoning, was launched in April 2017 and commissioned in December 2019.

Fujian has, like Shandong, been based at Sanya, as part of the Southern Theatre Command. Its CATOBAR system and AEW&C equipped air wing allow it to project power without relying on land-based support, extending China's naval reach into the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. China's over 100 destroyers, frigates and nuclear attack submarines provide more than sufficient escorts to form multiple Carrier Strike Groups. Sanya provides the ideal base for exerting control over the heavily contested South China Sea, acting as a potential constraint on US, Australian and Philippine activities in the region. A third carrier gives the PLAN the ability to conduct a multi-carrier blockade of Taiwan. Fujian also represents a quantum leap in naval technology, demonstrating a key component of President Xi Jinping's goal of a world-class military by mid-century. In sum, Fujian provides a strong signal of China's ambitions to be a strong maritime power capable of challenging the dominance of the US in the Indo-Pacific.

For India, Fujian's commissioning and China's ongoing carrier-building programme should provide a wake-up call highlighting the urgent need to strengthen its aircraft carrier capability. India began operating aircraft carriers in the 1960's, at a time when the PLA (Navy) had no blue-water capability. In a little over the last decade, however, the PLA (Navy) has forged far ahead. Fujian, with her larger air wing, EMALS based CATOBAR system and the ability to launch fully-equipped AEW&C aircraft including fifth generation fighters and ASW helicopters, is a generational leap over India's capability. Moreover, reports indicate that China is building a fourth aircraft carrier, presently known as the Type 004, which will have nuclear propulsion, EMALS, will displace over 110,000 tons and have an air wing comprising over 100 aircraft, making it larger than the current generation of US carriers. The ship will provide another generational leap. Reports indicate that she will be operational in the late 2020s and as many as four ships of the class will be built, taking China's aircraft carrier strength to seven ships by about 2035. The strategic clarity of the programme is remarkable – China has set out to dominate the seas around it and is building all the instruments required to do so. India, meanwhile, continues to muddle along with inconclusive debates taking the place of strategic clarity. The day when a carrier-based PLA (Navy)

Task Group will deploy regularly, if not continuously into the Indian Ocean are coming closer. Given that India will take at least a decade to construct and field an aircraft carrier, time for clear thinking on India's future shipbuilding programme is running away.

The MBS Visit to Washington

The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US has been contentious particularly since the Biden administration assumed office in 2021. While campaigning, Biden had vowed to make Saudi Arabia a global pariah for the murder and dismemberment of Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018. During his first year in office, he released an intelligence report accusing Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) of complicity in the murder, disclosed a report on 9/11 that potentially implicated Saudi Arabia, refused to provide the country with precision missiles for its war in Yemen, and refused to communicate with MBS. The China Russia partnership, Russia's war in Ukraine and the need to replace oil from Moscow to ensure the stability of the world's energy markets resulted in the triumph of realpolitik over moral outrage. Biden felt compelled to visit Jeddah in July 2022 and reached out to MBS with a fist bump that reflected both his distaste for the Saudi Crown Prince and his inability to do anything about it¹⁴. There was no return visit by MBS to the US.

That gap was bridged when MBS made his first visit to the US in seven years on November 18-19, 2025, highlighting normalisation and advancement of the US-Saudi relationship. The visit was conducted amidst significant pageantry, signifying not just the personal rehabilitation of MBS on the world stage, but also a recalibration of strategic cooperation between Riyadh and Washington under President Donald Trump. MBS was received with exceptional fanfare, including a horseback procession, red-carpet welcome, ceremonial military honours, a flypast by jets and a formal state dinner at the White House. President Trump's personal involvement sent a powerful message about the administration's priorities and willingness to move past tensions linked to the Jamal Khashoggi murder. In the Oval Office, both leaders highlighted their commitment to a strategic partnership focused on economic growth, security, and regional stability.

A focal point of MBS's agenda was the signing of a US-Saudi Strategic Defence Agreement, reinforcing an 80-year partnership and elevating Saudi Arabia to "major non-NATO ally" (MNNA) status. This designation fast-tracks Saudi access to advanced US military hardware and deepens formal security ties, positioning Riyadh among a select group of key American allies. President Trump approved a major

¹⁴ See 'Biden's Middle East Visit' Indo-Pacific Monitor Volume III Issue 7, July 2022, https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/storage/uploads/publications_file/indo-pacific-monitor-4099.pdf

defence sales package, including two squadrons of F-35 aircraft and 300 Abrams tanks¹⁵. The US and Saudi Arabia signed a joint declaration on the completion of negotiations on civil nuclear energy cooperation¹⁶. However, Washington did not agree to two Saudi requests: domestic enrichment of uranium for civilian nuclear use, and a binding mutual defence treaty. Saudi Arabia did not agree to recognise Israel or agree to accede to the Abrahams Accords. Nevertheless, Trump's recognition of Saudi Arabia as a major security partner marks a pivotal realignment of the US defence architecture in the Gulf.

On the economic front, MBS announced that Saudi investment commitments in the US would approach \$1 trillion, vastly increasing previous pledges and making the Kingdom one of the largest sources of foreign capital for US industry. These investments are directed towards high-tech sectors, infrastructure, job creation in the US, and bolstering critical supply chains—all closely aligned with the Trump administration's industrial policy goals.

A breakthrough component of the deals struck was the acceleration of technology collaboration between the two countries. Saudi Arabia secured rights to procure advanced US artificial intelligence technology, with major US firms agreeing to provide cutting-edge AI chips and support. These arrangements are integral to MBS's flagship "Vision 2030" programme, aimed at transforming Saudi Arabia into a diversified, innovation-driven economy and a regional technology hub. High-level discussions also included joint development projects, technology transfer protocols, and significant outreach to Silicon Valley and US private equity leaders, evidenced by a prominent investment forum held during the visit.

Regional stability was a core topic, particularly in the Horn of Africa. MBS requested, and Trump committed to, a new US-led diplomatic initiative to resolve the civil war in Sudan, with the Saudi government positioned as a key regional interlocutor. Both sides reaffirmed their intent to promote a peaceful settlement in Gaza and demonstrated support for broader diplomatic engagement, including openness to facilitating a future US-Iran agreement if it promotes regional security.

A central feature of dialogue between the leaders was moving forward on the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which both Washington and Riyadh pitch as a strategic alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative. Commitments were

¹⁵ Fact Sheet: President Donald J Trump Solidifies Economic and Defense Partnership with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, November 18, 2025, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-solidifies-economic-and-defense-partnership-with-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia/>

¹⁶ US Energy Secretary and Saudi Arabia's Energy Minister Announce Deal on Civil Nuclear Cooperation, November 19, 2025, <https://www.energy.gov/articles/us-energy-secretary-and-saudi-arabias-energy-minister-announce-deal-civil-nuclear>

broadened to include renewable energy, digital infrastructure, and secure trade routes, highlighting the US interest in building a rules-based, transparent Eurasian infrastructure network that bypasses Chinese dominance.

MBS's visit to Washington catalysed a "strategic reset" that once again places Saudi Arabia at the heart of US policy for West Asia and the Indo-Pacific. The White House emphasised that these expanded economic and security commitments were designed to reinforce US supply chain resilience, diminish Chinese and Russian influence, and build a high-tech alliance with the Kingdom as a cornerstone. For India and other key US Indo-Pacific partners, the Saudi-US defence and technology cooperation could have ripple effects, potentially complicating regional security calculations, especially with Saudi-Pakistan relations in mind.

The visit drew scrutiny from human rights advocates and groups representing families of the victims of the September 11 attacks. Critics highlighted the administration's willingness to sideline human rights in favour of pragmatic, material gains. While Trump characterised the visit as an investment in the future, critics viewed the warm embrace of MBS as eroding US leverage on issues of governance and accountability in the Kingdom.

The MBS visit to the United States signals a new era in US-Saudi relations defined by massive economic commitments, unprecedented technology transfers and a robust security alignment. The deals signed and public pageantry underscore MBS's rehabilitation as a central figure in global diplomacy and, in Trump's view, the undisputed leader of the Arab world. The partnership announced in Washington sets the stage for deeper economic interdependence, a shift toward mutual strategic priorities, and an even more prominent Saudi role in regional and global policy.

Other Indo-Pacific Developments

ADMM (Plus). The 12th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus convened in Kuala Lumpur on November 01¹⁷. The ministers committed to enhancing practical cooperation to solidify ADMM-Plus as a platform for tangible action, fostering information sharing and facilitating timely and effective communication among ADMM-Plus countries to strengthen confidence-building measures in the region, increasing capacity building initiatives, and strengthening the ADMM-Plus framework and deepening defence cooperation. They reaffirmed the importance of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and

¹⁷ Joint Statement by the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) in commemoration of the 15th Anniversary of the Founding of ADMM-Plus, November 01, 2025, <https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/JOINT-STATEMENT-BY-THE-ASEAN-DEFENCE-MINISTERS-MEETING-PLUS-ADMM-PLUS.pdf>

national identity of member nations, maintaining and promoting peace, security, stability, prosperity, safety and freedom of navigation and overflight. Speaking at the meeting, India's Defence Minister Shri Rajnath Singh said that India's emphasis on the rule of law, particularly UNCLOS, and its advocacy for freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific are not directed against any country but are meant to safeguard the collective interests of all regional stakeholders¹⁸. He described the ADMM-Plus as an essential component of India's 'Act East Policy' and broader Indo-Pacific vision.

South Korea to Build Nuclear Attack Submarines. Following his meeting with South Korea's President Lee Jae-Myung at Gyeongju on October 29, media reports indicated that US President Donald Trump had agreed to let South Korea build nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) on US soil, at the Hanwha Shipyard in Philadelphia¹⁹. The decision was formally announced by the White House on November 13, with a fact sheet stating "The United States has given approval for the ROK to build nuclear-powered attack submarines. The United States will work closely with the ROK to advance requirements for this shipbuilding project, including avenues to source fuel"²⁰. The decision potentially makes the ROK the world's 9th nuclear propelled submarine operator, after the US, Russia, UK, France, China and India, which already operate such submarines, and Australia and Brazil, both of which have ongoing programmes to build them.

Australia Canada India Trilateral Partnership. The Prime Ministers of India, Australia and Canada announced on the sidelines of the G-20 meeting that the three countries have entered into a trilateral technology and innovation partnership²¹. The ACITI partnership is designed to leverage each country's unique technological and industrial strengths. Core areas of collaboration include green energy innovation; critical minerals supply chains and artificial intelligence.

Thailand Cambodia Truce. The Thailand Cambodia truce deal, announced by US President Donald Trump on October 26, 2025, was suspended on November 10 after

¹⁸ India's emphasis on rule of law and freedom of navigation and overflight in Indo-Pacific is not against any country, but to safeguard interests of all regional stakeholders: Raksha Mantri at ADMM-Plus, November 01, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2185071>

¹⁹ USA Gives South Korea Green Light to Build Nuclear Submarines, October 31, 2025, <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/10/usa-gives-south-korea-green-light-to-build-nuclear-submarines/>

²⁰ Joint Fact Sheet on President Donald J. Trump's Meeting with President Lee Jae Myung, November 13, 2025, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/joint-fact-sheet-on-president-donald-j-trumps-meeting-with-president-lee-jae-myung/>

²¹ Joint statement by the Government of India, the Government of Australia and the government of Canada, November 22, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2193028>

four Thai soldiers were injured by landmine blasts²². Thailand accused Cambodia of planting new landmines in violation of the accord, while Cambodia denied having done so.

Australia Designates IRGC as State Sponsor of Terrorism. The government of Australia designated Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as its first state sponsor of terrorism on November 27²³. The action came following an intelligence assessment that the IRGC had orchestrated attacks against Australia's Jewish community in Sydney and Melbourne in October and December 2024 respectively. In response, Australia passed the Criminal Code Amendment (State Sponsors of Terrorism) Act 2025, creating a new framework to allow the Government to respond to state-sponsored terrorism. Australia had also expelled the Iranian ambassador and three diplomats in August 2025, and suspended operations at its embassy in Tehran. Iran condemned the designation as illegal and unjustifiable.

Australia Japan Philippines US Defence Ministers' Statement. Defence Ministers from Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the US met for the fifth time in the last three years at Kuala Lumpur on the sidelines of the ADMM+ Meeting on November 01²⁴. They reiterated their serious concern regarding China's destabilising actions in the East and South China Seas and their strong opposition to change the status quo by force or coercion. They reaffirmed the focus of their countries to joint efforts on deterrence and operational readiness, as well as to enhancing coordinated defence cooperation activities.

Indonesia Japan Foreign and Defence Ministers' Meeting. The 3rd Indonesia Japan Foreign and Defence Ministers 2+2 Meeting took place on November 17, about 4 ½ years after the second meeting²⁵. The ministers welcomed the provision by Japan to Indonesia of a large patrol vessel and high-speed patrol boats and said they would further expand such ship transfers. They adopted a common position on the situation in the East and South China Seas, North Korea, the Middle East and Myanmar.

India Australia Foreign Ministers' Framework Dialogue. The 16th India-Australia Foreign Ministers' Framework Dialogue was co-chaired by EAM Dr. S. Jaishankar and

²² Thailand Suspends Trump-Backed Peace Talks with Cambodia, November 10, 2025, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/10/world/asia/thailand-cambodia-peace-talks-trump.html>

²³ Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps listed as a state sponsor of terrorism, November 27, 2025, <https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-listed-state-sponsor-terrorism>

²⁴ Joint Readout of the Meeting of Defence Ministers from Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States, November 03, 2025, <https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2025-11-03/joint-readout-meeting-defense-ministers-from-australia-japan-philippines-united-states>

²⁵ Third Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting ("2+2"), November 17, 2025, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01831.html

Australia Foreign Minister Penny Wong in New Delhi on November 20²⁶. Discussions focused on expanding cooperation across various sectors and reinforcing a shared vision for a free, open, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific. The dialogue marked the five-year anniversary of the bilateral CSP, with both ministers highlighting the remarkable expansion across all pillars of cooperation.

NSA Level Meeting of Colombo Security Conclave. The 7th NSA level meeting of the Colombo Security Conclave was held in New Delhi on November 20²⁷. The meeting was attended by NSAs from India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles, which was welcomed as a new full member. Malaysia attended as a guest. Member states reviewed progress and discussed strengthening cooperation across five core areas: Maritime Safety and Security; Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation; Combating Trafficking and Transnational Organised Crime; Cyber Security and Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Technology; and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR).

India Indonesia Defence Ministers' Dialogue. The third India-Indonesia Defence Ministers' Dialogue took place in New Delhi on November 27²⁸. The dialogue follows Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto's visit to India in January this year, which provided momentum to the bilateral relationship. Both sides agreed to enhance cooperation through forums such as IORA under India's chairmanship and practical cooperation in maritime domain awareness, cyber resilience and joint operational readiness. Other discussion points included defence industry collaboration, military-to-military engagements, maritime security and multilateral cooperation, defence technology, submarine capability and medical cooperation, and support for international peace and humanitarian efforts.

Indonesia Explores Procurement of Japanese Ships. Indonesia's Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin visited Yokosuka Naval Base along with his Japanese counterpart Shinjiro Koizumi where they inspected several MSDF vessels, including the Mogami-class frigate Kumano and the destroyer Murasame, as well as a Taigei class

²⁶ Opening remarks 16th India Australia Foreign Ministers Framework Dialogue, November 20, 2025, <https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/transcript/opening-remarks-16th-india-australia-foreign-ministers-framework-dialogue>

²⁷ 7th NSA Level Meeting of the Colombo Security Conclave, November 20, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/40314/7th_NSA_Level_Meeting_of_the_Colombo_Security_Conclave_November_20_2025

²⁸ Raksha Mantri and his Indonesian counterpart co-chair third India-Indonesia Defence Ministers' Dialogue in New Delhi; Agree to further deepen defence ties, November 27, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2195269>

submarine²⁹. Japan has proposed building four Mogami-class frigates for Indonesia, with four more being built by the state-owned shipyard PT-PAL.

Japan – Fiji Summit and Partnership. The Prime Ministers of Japan and Fiji, Sanae Takaichi and Sitiveni Rabuka, held a bilateral summit meeting in Tokyo on November 13³⁰. The leaders decided to establish the Japan-Fiji Lomavata (unity) Kizuna (bonds of trust) Partnership to guide the efforts of the two countries towards the shared ambition of placing long-standing relations as a basis for their strategic cooperation.

US India MCG Meeting. US Indo-Pacom Deputy Commander Lt Gen Joshua M Rudd and India's CIDS Air Marshal Ashutosh Dixit co-chaired the 22nd meeting of the US India Military Cooperation Group in Honolulu on November 03-04. They discussed logistics cooperation, enhancing military interoperability, expanding joint technology development and co-production, improving intelligence and information sharing, and strengthening regional security coordination in the Indo-Pacific. Representatives of the US Africa Command, Central Command and Space Command were also present.

Australia Establishes Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator. Australia achieved another milestone in the AUKUS programme by establishing the Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator on November 01³¹. The statutory new agency is responsible for the effective regulatory oversight of Australia's naval nuclear propulsion capabilities. Mr Michael Drake was appointed the inaugural Director General of the new Agency headquartered in Canberra.

Japan MoD Budget Request. Japan's Ministry of Defense has requested a record budget of approximately 8.8 trillion yen (about \$ 60.2 billion) for FY 2026, reflecting a continued upward trajectory in military spending amid growing regional security challenges³². The request prioritises the development of a national multi-layered coastal defence system named "SHIELD", provides funding for upgrades to two Aegis destroyers to support Tomahawk cruise missiles and advancing submarine-launched missile programmes, and for the construction of new patrol vessels. The budget underscores an accelerated shift towards unmanned, long-range and multi-layered

²⁹ Indonesia's Defence Chief Inspects MSDF Vessels as Talk of Exports Grows, November 17, 2025, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/11/17/japan/politics/japan-indonesia-defense-chiefs/>

³⁰ Lomavata Kizuna Partnership – Joint Communique on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Partnership between Japan and the Republic of Fiji to elevate the relations to Greater Heights, November 13, 2025, <https://japan.kantei.go.jp/content/000185667.pdf>

³¹ An AUKUS milestone – launch of the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator, November 01, 2025, <https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2025-11-01/aukus-milestone-launch-australian-naval-nuclear-power-safety-regulator>

³² Overview of FY2026 Budget Request, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/pdf/fy2026_20250924a.pdf

defence solutions, with significant investments in technology, infrastructure and joint operational capabilities.

Annual Report of US China Economic and Security Review Commission. The 2025 report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission was published on November 18, 2025³³. Among the key recommendations of the commission is that the Trump administration should launch a new agency to address the national security challenges posed by Beijing's systematic and persistent evasion of US export controls and sanctions. The proposed agency should blend elements of the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, State and Defense with the intelligence community and law enforcement to bolster monitoring of export restrictions and ensure detection and punishment of any violations of those regimes.

CNS Visit to the US. Admiral DK Tripathi, Chief of the Naval Staff, proceeded on an official visit to the US from November 12-17³⁴. The visit was intended to strengthen the maritime partnership between the IN and the USN.

South Korea Cancels SAR Exercise with Japan. South Korea has informed Japan of its intention of not conducting a planned joint search and rescue exercise between the MSDF and the South Korean Navy this month³⁵. The South Korean action may be retaliation for Japan's recent cancellation of refuelling for South Korean Air Force aircraft this month. There is concern that defence exchanges between Tokyo and Seoul may be stalling.

India Gets KC-135 Stratotanker. The Indian Air Force's air-to-air refuelling capability received a boost when a Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker arrived in Agra under a three-year lease agreement on November 21. The tanker, operated by the US-based Metrea Management, comes with a trained crew, maintenance and logistical support, delivering up to 100 refuelling flight hours per month, enabling India to overcome the low serviceability rates of its existing fleet of IL-78MKI tankers acquired from Russia.

Change of US Fleet Commanders. V Adm Curt Renshaw assumed command of the US Naval Forces Central Command/US Fifth Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) on November 14, relieving V Adm George Wikoff³⁶. The same day, V Adm Pat

³³ 2025 Annual Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 18, 2025, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2025-11/2025_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf

³⁴ Chief of the Naval Staff Visit to the United States, November 12, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2189075>

³⁵ Japan-South Korea defense drill unlikely to take place this month, November 19, 2025, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/11/19/japan/politics/japan-south-korea-drill-canceled/>

³⁶ Vice Adm. Renshaw Assumed Command of US 5th Fleet, November 16, 2025, <https://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/4332622/vice-adm-renshaw-assumes-command-of-us-5th-fleet/>

J Hannifin took over command of the US Seventh Fleet, relieving V Adm Fred W Kacher³⁷.

Sea Trials of Sichuan. Sichuan, the first of the PLA (Navy)'s new LHD's, sailed for her first sea trial from November 14-16³⁸. The ship has a displacement of over 40,000 tonnes and is the second Chinese ship equipped with EMALS, enabling it to carry fixed wing aircraft, helicopters and amphibious equipment.

Iran Seizes MT Talara. IRGC forces seized the Cyprus registered Marshal Islands flagged tanker MT Talara, bound from Sharjah to Singapore and carrying 30,000 tonnes of petrochemicals in the Strait of Hormuz on November 14³⁹. Iran claimed that the seizure was to safeguard the interests and resources of the Iranian nation. The ship was released and commenced normal operations on November 19.

Commissioning of IN Ships. INS Ikshak, the third Survey Vessel Large, was commissioned into the Indian Navy by the CNS at Kochi on November 06, 2025⁴⁰. INS Mahe, the first indigenous ASW Shallow Water Craft, was commissioned by the COAS at Mumbai on November 24, 2025⁴¹. The Indian Navy has commissioned six major war vessels – IN ships Surat, Nilgiri, Vaghsheer, Tamal, Himgiri and Udaygiri, three minor war vessels – IN ships Androth, Arnala and Mahe, and one survey vessel – INS Ikshak – during the year 2025.

Delivery of Taragiri. Taragiri, the fourth ship of the Nilgiri-class (Project 17A) and the third built by Mazagon Dock Shipbuilding Ltd (MDL) was delivered to the Indian Navy on November 28⁴². The remaining three ships of the class are expected to be delivered by August 2026.

Sale of US Arms to India. The US State Department notified Congress of its approval on November 19 for the sale to India of 216 M982A1 Excalibur projectiles⁴³ estimated

³⁷ US 7th Fleet holds change of command, welcomes new commander, November 14, 2025, <https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/4331295/us-7th-fleet-holds-change-of-command-welcomes-new-commander/>

³⁸ Chinese PLA Navy's Amphibious Assault Ship "Sichuan" Completes First Navigation Test, November 16, 2025, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2025xb/H_251454/L_251456/16422200.html

³⁹ Iranian Forces Illegally Seize Commercial Tanker in International Waters, November 16, 2025, <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4332632/iranian-forces-illegally-seize-commercial-tanker-in-international-waters/>

⁴⁰ Commissioning of INS Ikshak, Third of the SVL Class Ship, November 06, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2187178>

⁴¹ INS Mahe Commissioned – India's First Mahe-Class Anti-Submarine Warfare Shallow Water Craft Joins the Western Naval Command, November 24, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2193558>

⁴² Delivery of 'Taragiri', the Fourth Nilgiri Class (Project 17A) Indigenous Advanced Stealth Frigate, November 29, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2196229®=3&lang=1>

⁴³ India – Excalibur Projectiles, November 19, 2025, <https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article-Display/Article/4337518/india-excalibur-projectiles>

to cost \$ 47.1 million and the Javelin Missile System⁴⁴ and related equipment estimated to cost \$ 45.7 million. The sale is intended to improve India's precision strike capability.

Exercise Malabar 2025. The US hosted the 29th edition of Exercise Malabar at/off Guam from November 11-18⁴⁵. The harbour phase was in Guam from November 11-14, while the sea phase took place in the vicinity of Guam from November 15-18. Participating units included HMAS Ballarat, INS Sahyadri, JS Hyuga, USS Fitzgerald and one US attack submarine. P-8A aircraft from Australia and the US also participated.

Exercise Mitra Shakti. The 11th edition of the Joint India-Sri Lanka exercise MITRA SHAKTI 2025 was conducted at the Foreign Training Node, Belagavi, Karnataka, from November 10-23⁴⁶. The exercise is aimed at jointly conducting sub-conventional operations under Chapter VII of the UN Mandate.

Exercise Garuda 25. IAF aircraft participated in the 8th edition of bilateral exercise Garuda 25 with the French Air and Space Force at Mont-de-Marsan, France, from November 16-27⁴⁷. Participating units from India included Su-30MKI, C-17 and IL-78 aircraft.

INS Savitri Visits Mauritius, Mozambique and the Seychelles. INS Savitri, on a long-range deployment to the Southwestern Indian Ocean, visited Mauritius from November 01-04⁴⁸, Port Beira in Mozambique from November 10-13⁴⁹, and Port Victoria in the Seychelles from November 22-25⁵⁰. The ship carried out joint EEZ surveillance with forces from the host nation, apart from professional interactions and sharing of best practices while in port. The deployment is in consonance with India's MAHASAGAR vision and reinforces India's role as the preferred security partner and first responder in the Indian Ocean.

⁴⁴ India- Javelin Missile System, November 19, 2025, <https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article-Display/Article/4337533/india-javelin-missile-system>

⁴⁵ Exercise Malabar 2025 at Guam, November 09, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2188052>

⁴⁶ India – Sri Lanka Joint Exercise Mitra Shakti – 2025 Commenced Today, November 10, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2188370>

⁴⁷ Exercise Garuda 25: Indian Air Force Participates in 8th Edition of Bilateral Air Exercise with French Air and Space Force, November 15, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2190299>

⁴⁸ Visit of Indian Naval Ship Savitri to Port Louis, Mauritius, November 02, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2185681>

⁴⁹ INS Savitri Arrives in Mozambique, Fostering Stronger Bilateral Maritime Ties, November 10, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2188483>

⁵⁰ Visit of Indian Naval Ship Savitri to Seychelles for Joint EEZ Surveillance, November 22, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2192956®=3&lang=1>



Visit of LCUs to Colombo. Three IN Landing Crafts (Utility), INLCU 51, 54 and 57 from the Andaman and Nicobar Command visited Colombo from November 22-25⁵¹. The long-range deployment of these Landing Craft to a foreign harbour is unusual.

INS Sahyadri Visits Manila. INS Sahyadri, returning from Guam after participating in Exercise Malabar 2025, exercised with the Philippines Navy on November 26 and made a port call at Manila from November 27-30⁵².

IN Ships Vikrant and Udaygiri at Colombo. IN ships Vikrant and Udaygiri visited Colombo to participate in the International Fleet Review from November 27 – 29⁵³. The visit marks the maiden overseas deployment for both ships. The event is part of Sri Lanka's 75th anniversary celebrations.

⁵¹ Indian Naval LCUs 51, 54 and 57 Visit Colombo, Sri Lanka, November 26, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2194906>

⁵² INS Sahyadri Makes Port Call at Manila, Philippines, November 27, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2195133>

⁵³ INS Vikrant and INS Udaygiri Participate in Sri Lanka Navy International Fleet Review 2025 at Colombo, November 28, 2025, <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2195767®=3&lang=1>



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